Environmental Law—Judicial Enforcement of the Marine Mammal Protection Act: Committee for Humane Legislation v. Richardson by Conley, Margaret
Urban Law Annual ; Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law
Volume 14
January 1977
Environmental Law—Judicial Enforcement of the
Marine Mammal Protection Act: Committee for
Humane Legislation v. Richardson
Margaret Conley
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw
Part of the Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Urban Law Annual ; Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law by an authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship.
For more information, please contact digital@wumail.wustl.edu.
Recommended Citation
Margaret Conley, Environmental Law—Judicial Enforcement of the Marine Mammal Protection Act: Committee for Humane Legislation v.
Richardson, 14 Urb. L. Ann. 263 (1977)
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol14/iss1/12
JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF THE MARINE
MAMMAL PROTECTION ACT: COMMITTEE
FOR HUMANE LEGISLATION
V RICHARDSON
The Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 (MMPA) is the most
recent piece of federal legislation protecting those marine mammals,
including porpoises, endangered by the economic exploitation of the
environment. In Committee for Humane Legislation, Inc. v. Richard-
son,2 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the
MMPA must be construed literally to prohibit the killing of porpoises
incidental to tuna fishing despite industry protestations that it was
technologically impossible to comply with the requirements of the
Act.3 The decision represents an important step forward in the area of
environmental law because the court gave its full support to the terms
of the MMPA and its literal application regardless of the economic
repercussions that would be felt by the tuna fishing industry.
One purpose of the MMPA is to ensure that the porpoise population
is not depleted4 by purse-seine fishing, a tuna fishing technique
which uses nets and entails the incidental killing5 of large numbers of
porpoises. 6 Under the Act, purse-seine fishing is prohibited except
1. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (Supp. III 1973).
2. 540 F.2d 1141 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
3. 414 F. Supp. 297, 310 (D.D.C. 1976).
4. "Depleted" or "depletion" is defined as a marine mammal population which has
declined over a period of years and will become extinct if such decline continues, or
which is below the optimum carrying capacity for the species. 16 U.S.C. § 1362(1) (Supp.
V 1975).
5. "Incidental catch" means the taking of a marine mammal (1) because it is directly
interfering with commercial fishing operations, or (2) as a consequence of the method
used to secure the fish in connection with commercial fishing operation. 50 C.F.R. §
216.3 (1976).
6. Before the 1960's the most common method of fishing for tuna was with a fishing
pole and fresh bait. In the late 1950's a new method of catching yellowfin tuna was
devised which was five times as efficient as the old fishing pole method. The new
method involved using porpoises, with whom tuna frequently associate, to lure tuna into
purse-seine nets. When porpoises are sighted on the ocean surface, speed boats are used
to herd them to where the net will be set. The tuna follow, swimming below the
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
where a permit, which is consistent with the goal of protecting marine
mammals, is issued7 by the Secretary. 8 Before the Secretary can issue
permits, regulations governing their issuance must be published. The
regulations must include an estimate of the existing population of the
species, the optimum sustainable population of the species, 9 and the
expected impact of the proposed regulations on the optimum sustain-
able population of the species.' 0
In September, 1974, the Secretary of Commerce issued regulations
which allowed the unlimited taking of porpoises, even though the
Department had none of the required information regarding the present
state of the porpoise population." The Secretary claimed that the
Department was unable to compile the requisite information because
of the lack of reliable scientific knowledge about the porpoise popula-
tion and the unavailability of accurate methods by which such informa-
tion could be gathered.12 Despite these omissions, a general permit was
granted to the American Tunaboat Association in 1974,13 and again in
porpoises. The porpoises and tuna are then encircled with a purse-seine net and the
bottom is drawn closed with a drawstring, trapping both the tuna and the porpoises. This
method may mean the death of 250,000 to 400,000 porpoises per year in the eastern
tropical Pacific tuna grounds alone. 540 F.2d at 1143-44; 40 Fed. Reg. 56,900 (1975); K.
NORRIS, THE PORPOISE WATCHER 241 (1974). The MMPA does not prohibit purse-seine
fishing, but it does prohibit the depletion of the porpoise population as a result of the
purse-seine fishing method. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2) (Supp. V 1975).
7. 16 U.S.C. § 1371 (Supp. V 1975).
8. "Secretary" means the Secretary of Commerce when the marine mammal in
question is a whale, porpoise, or seal. With regard to polar bears, sea otters, walruses,
and other marine mammals, it means the Secretary of Interior. Id. § 1362(12).
9. "Optimum sustainable population" means a population that is at a level of max-
imum productivity of the species, that is at the limit of the environment to sustain
healthy populations indefinitely, and that does not adversely affect the ecosystem of
which it is a part. Id. § 1362(9).
10. Id. § 1373.
11. 39 Fed. Reg. 32,117 (1974).
12. Id. at 9685; see K. NORRIS, THE PORPOISE WATCHER 242 (1974):
[W]e know so little of the biology of oceanic porpoises that we cannot say what the
impact upon their populations will be. We don't know how many porpoises are
involved, and we don't know their normal replacement rate. We don't know
whether porpoises within the tuna-fishing area are sedentary and hence subject to
great fishing pressure, or whether they move long distances and thus move in and
out of danger. The affected population size may be very much greater than the
number of porpoises found at one time in the tuna area. Our ignorance of these and
other vital facts is deep. . . . We simply do not know enough to make a rational
estimate [of what level of kill porpoise schools can endure], and the secretiveness
of tuna fishermen compounds the problem.
13. 540 F.2d 1141, 1146 n. 15; General Permit Under the Category: Encircling Gear;
Yellowfin Tuna Purse Seining, 39 Fed. Reg. 38,403 (1974).
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1975,11 to allow the unlimited taking of porpoises incidental to the
purse-seine method of catching tuna.
In Committee for Humane Legislation,15 plaintiffs challenged the
legality of these unlimited permits, 16 asserting that they were contrary
to the terms of the statute. 17 The Secretary contended that full com-
pliance under the Act was unnecessary in this case since the congres-
sional intent 8 was not to force tuna fishermen out of business, but
rather to balance the purposes of the MMPA with the potential
economic harm to the commercial fishing industry.19 The district court
found for the plaintiffs and ordered that no taking of porpoises would
be allowed until the Secretary had sufficient information to comply
fully with the MMPA.20 The court of appeals affirmed, requiring that
an estimated impact of any proposed taking be ascertained and that
such taking may not be authorized if the impact is found to be detri-
mental to the mammals involved. 21
14. 540 F.2d 1141, 1147 n.21.
15. 414 F. Supp. 297 (D.D.C. 1976).
16. Any applicant for a permit, or any party opposed to such permit is allowed
judicial review of any permit issued by the Secretary. 16 U.S.C. § 1374(d)(6) (Supp. V
1975).
17. The appellees claimed that the Secretary must in all cases fully comply with the
requirements of the statute. They contended that no permits should have been issued
despite the economic hardships that would be suffered by the tuna industry. 414 F. Supp.
at 306. They relied on the statute which states that "[t]he primary objective in [marine
mammal] management should be to maintain the health and stability of the marine
ecosystem." 16 U.S.C. § 1361(6) (Supp. V 1975). In addition they referred to the House
Report on the proposed legislation which emphasized that the benefit of the marine
mammals was the paramount consideration. "The primary objective of this management
must be to maintain the health and stability of the marine ecosystem; this in turn
indicates that the animals must be managed for their benefit and not for the benefit of
commercial exploitation." H.R. REP. No. 707, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1971).
18. Strong language referred to by appellants in the legislative history states: "It is
not the intention of the Committee to shut down or significantly to curtail the activities of
the tuna fleet so long as the Secretary is satisfied that the tuna fishermen are using
economically and technologically practicable measures to assure minimal hazards to
marine mammal populations." S. REP. No. 863, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1972).
19. Representative Goodling made remarks on the floor to this effect, saying "[t]here
must be an appropriate balancing of equities between the two extremes of a zero
mortality rate and elimination of a commercial fishing industry." 118 CONG. REC. 34,643
(1972).
20. 414 F. Supp. at 314-15.
21. 540 F.2d 1141 (D.C. Cir. 1976). The court of appeals stayed the district court
order until January 16, 1977. The court's reason for granting a stay was to allow the
appellants time to ask Congress to change the statute to require only good faith com-
pliance and to give them time to conduct more gear and porpoise studies. Id. The bill that
would have effectively overruled the court's decision failed to pass the 94th Congress.
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Prior to the enactment of the MMPA in 1972, there were few laws
which prohibited or penalized the taking or importation of marine
mammals. 22 Those laws which did exist were incomplete and ineffec-
tive due to weaknesses in statutory wording and Congress' unwilling-
ness to protect the environment at the expense of commerce and
industry.23
The foundation of the MMPA is the moratorium- "a complete
cessation of the taking of marine mammals and a complete ban on the
importation into the United States of marine mammals and marine
mammal products.''24 The moratorium creates a presumption that
Marine Mammal Amendments: Hearings on H.R. 13865 Before the Subcomm. on
Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the Environment of the House Comm. on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 171-73 (1976). See generally
Comment, Federal Courts and Congress Review Tuna-Porpoise Controversy, 6 E.L.R.
10147 (1976).
22. See generally Coggins, Legal Protection for Marine Mammals: An Overview of
Innovative Resource Conservation Legislation, 6 ENv. L. 2-10, 20 (1975).
23. One of the several pieces of legislation which purports to preserve wildlife,
including marine mammals, but which provides very incomplete protection is the Fish
and Wildlife Act of 1956, 16 U.S.C. §§ 742-54 (1958). The only effective regulation
created therein is the prohibition against airborne hunting. Id. § 742j-1 (Supp. V 1975).
Another such act is the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, 48 Stat. 401 (1934) (current
version at 16 U.S.C. §§ 661-668 (1970)), which provides protection, but only for wildlife
in designated preserve areas. The Act is further weakened by placing the responsibility
for compliance on the applicant and taking the enforcement power away from the
Commission. Id. § 662. See Iowa v. FPC, 178 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339
U.S. 979 (1950). A similar act providing ineffective regulations is the Fur Seal Act of
1966, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1187 (Supp. 111965-66) (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 1581-
1587 (1970)) which prohibits the killing of fur seals and sea otters, except by natives of
the Pribolof Islands. One of the most recent statutes which attempts to effectively
protect animals, including marine mammals, is the Endangered Species Act of 1973
(ESA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (Supp. III 1973), Pub. Law. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884
(1969). The ESA's power is weakened by the requirement that the administrative agency
must affirmatively take steps to classify animal species as threatened or endangered and
make rules for their protection before the prohibitions of the ESA become effective and
the animals become protected. 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (Supp. III 1973). This method is
ineffective because it is slow and places too much discretion in the hands of the
administrator. See Coggins, Conserving Wildlife Resources: An Overview of the En-
dangered Species Act of 1973, 51 N.D. L. Rav. 315, 328-33, 337 (1974).
These problems do not arise in the MMPA because the Act is unambiguous. The
statute explicitly states that the MMPA is meant to protect the ecosystem and the
optimum sustainable population of the species, 16 U.S.C. § 1362(9) (Supp. V 1975),
rather than to maintain an optimum harvestable commercial yield. See H.R. REP. No.
707, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
24. 16 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (Supp. V 1975). The moratorium was imposed by Congress in
response to the depleted condition of many marine mammal stocks and the scarcity of
scientific data available upon which to build management programs. 118 CoNo. REc.
7701 (1972) (remarks of Congressman Udall); id. at 25253. See S. Gaines & D. Schmidt,
Wildlife Population Management Under Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 6
E.L.R. 50,096, 50,098 (1976).
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marine mammals should be fully protected and places the burden of
justifying any waiver of the moratorium on the Secretary who must
demonstrate that the incidental taking of marine mammals is consistent
with the population management policies of the Act.2 Once the
moratorium has been waived, the Secretary must issue general regula-
tions pursuant to the policies of the MMPA regarding the maintenance
of the optimum sustainable population of the species. 26 Lastly, the
MMPA provides that the Secretary may issue permits authorizing the
taking or importation of any marine mammal if the permit specifies the
number and kind of marine mammals which are authorized to be taken
and the applicant demonstrates that the taking will serve the purposes
of the Act. 27
The three-tiered administrative system established by the MMPA
seeks to ensure the maintenance of the optimum sustainable popula-
tion levels of each species.28 At each stage in the process the adminis-
trators must demonstrate that their actions will not contravene the
policies of the Act. Thus, by demanding compliance with such explicit
procedures and requirements, the Secretary and the courts are seem-
ingly allowed little or no discretion in administering the Act.
In Committee for Humane Legislation, the Secretary relied on state-
ments of congressional purpose to show that Congress intended the
Secretary to apply a "rule of reason" when issuing permits.29 The
district court, however, rejected this approach and relied instead on
the literal meaning of the statutory language to find that Congress
25. 16 U.S.C. § 1374 (Supp. V 1975). SEN. COMM. ON COMMERCE, MARINE MAMMAL
PROTECTION ACT OF 1972, S. REP. No. 92-863, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1972); H.R. REP.
No. 92-707, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 18 (1971).
An exception to the moratorium requirement was initially granted by Congress for a
two-year interim period from 1972-74. To minimize undue economic hardship to the tuna
industry, commercial fishing operations were allowed to take porpoises incidental to
purse-seine fishing techniques used to catch yellowfin tuna. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)
(Supp. V 1975). This exception, however, was directly related to the policy being
promoted in the Act in that it allowed a period for the development of technology to
make compliance with the act possible. Id. § 1381.
26. 16 U.S.C. § 1373 (Supp. V 1975). Though the scope of the regulations is discre-
tionary with the administrator, five factors are emphasized in § 1373(b): population
levels, present and future; economic and technological feasibility of implementation;
ecosystem effects; existing international obligations; and conservation, development,
and utilization of fishery resources.
27. Id. § 1374.
28. S. Gaines & D. Schmidt, Wildlife Population Management Under Marine Mam-
mal Protection Act of 1972, 6 E.L.R. 50,096, 50,102 (1976).
29. See notes 18-19 supra.
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enacted the MMPA to "provide marine mammals, especially por-
poises, with necessary and exclusive protection against man's ac-
tivities. "30
The court of appeals, although affirming the district court decision,
took a different approach than the lower court in construing the statu-
tory language of the MMPA. Rather than confining itself to the "plain
meaning" rule of statutory interpretation, the court looked to the
legislative history, as well as to the statute itself, and concluded that a
significant portion of the legislative record justified the decision
reached by the district court.31 Notably, the court of appeals refused to
find the statute arbitrary, despite the fact that there was no basis in the
record for concluding that the counting of porpoises was technological-
ly feasible by the end of the two year interim period.32
The court's decision in Committee for Humane Legislation is of
great significance because the court, by refusing to compromise with
the American Tunaboat Association, effectively forced the devel-
opment of technology to meet the requirements of the MMPA. The
court's holding forces the Secretary to develop effective methods for
determining the existing porpoise population and the effect that a
"taking" would have upon the optimum sustainable porpoise popula-
30. 414 F. Supp. at 307. The plain meaning rule does not allow courts to use formal
legislative reports for the purpose of construing a statute contrary to its literal meaning.
The plain meaning rule may have been used by the district court in order to allow the
court to avoid weighing the conflicting legislative history. Murphy, Old Maxims Never
Die: The "Plain-Meaning Rule" and Statutory Interpretation in the "Modern Federal
Courts", 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1299, 1311 (1975). See United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S.
643, 648 (1961); Pennsylvania R.R. v. Int'l Coal Mining Co., 230 U.S. 184, 199 (1913);
FTC v. Retail Credit Co., 515 F.2d 988, 995 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Natural Resources
Defense Council v. EPA, 507 F.2d 905, 915 (9th Cir. 1974); Easson v. Comm'r, 294 F.2d
653, 656-57 (9th Cir. 1961); Gilbert v. Comm'r, 241 F.2d 491,494 (9th Cir. 1957); see also
2 A. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 48.14, at 220 (4th ed. 1973).
31. 540 F.2d 1141 (D.C. Cir. 1976). The court of appeals also found persuasive the
statements made in an oversight hearing held after entry of the district court decision in
this case. Congressman Leggett said he believed that the district court had correctly
interpreted the law as written and that:
the Secretary must first have proven to his satisfaction that any taking is consistent
with the purposes and policies of the Act. That is to say that taking will not be to the
disadvantage of the animals concerned. If he cannot make this finding, he cannot
issue a permit. It is that simple.
Hearings on Oversight of the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 and on H.R. 13865,
A Bill to Amend the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., Tr. at
34, 187 (May 20, 1976). The Federal courts have generally rejected the plain meaning rule
of statutory interpretation. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971).
32. 540 F.2d 1141, 1149-50 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
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tion.33 Furthermore, the tuna industry is compelled to devise improved
fishing methods and equipment so as to reduce to the maximum extent
practicable the incidental taking of marine mammals. 34 Thus, the
court's holding implicitly recognizes the fact that if standards which
are developed are applicable only to the number of porpoises that can
be ascertained through the use of presently available methods which
are technologically and economically feasible, the result would serve
to compromise the environment.3 5
Not until recently has this method of compelling the development of
technology, called "technology forcing," ' 36 become an accepted tech-
nique of encouraging individuals to search for solutions to particular
problems. The effectiveness of the technology forcing mechanism in
providing incentives to render solutions is clearly evidenced by the
aftermath of the court's decision in Committee for Humane Legisla-
tion. Although the Secretary had stated at the time of the court of
appeals hearing that technology would be unavailable for three to
seven years to meet the requirements of the MMPA, 37 two months
after the court's decision the Secretary was able to gather the neces-
sary data38 and publish regulations governing the incidental taking of
porpoises. 39
33. At the time that the MMPA was enacted there was no accurate method of
counting porpoises. 39 Fed. Reg. 32,117 (1974).
34. One of the new methods developed during this two-year period to help the
porpoise escape unharmed is the "backdown" procedure. The porpoises tend to congre-
gate at the extreme end of the net when the net is brought aboard the seiner, while the
tuna swim back and forth. Then following the "backdown" procedure, the seiner is
rapidly backed up, causing the corkline of the net to submerge at the end where the
porpoises are located and allowing them to escape. The method is not foolproof,
however, since several porpoises are killed every time a purse-seine net is "set." 40 Fed.
Reg. 56,889 (1975).
It must also be noted that the MMPA provides financial assistance for the purpose of
stimulating research for the protection and conservation of marine mammals. 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1380(a), 1381(a) (Supp. 11 1972). Historically, money alone has not been an adequate
incentive to force private concerns to develop new technology and for this reason
Congress has had to adopt the technology forcing mechanism to force development. See
generally L. TRIBE, CHANNELING TECHNOLOGY THROUGH LAW 52 (1973).
35. This sort of technology based standard would require no major innovation but
would look more to available technology and economic feasibility. La Pierre, Technolo-
gy-Forcing and Federal Environmental Protection Statutes, 62 IowA L. REV. 771 (1977)
(hereinafter cited as Technology Forcing).
36. Id. at 771-75.
37. Brief for Appellants at 21, Committee for Humane Legislation v. Richardson, 540
F.2d 1141 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
38. 16 U.S.C. § 1373(a) (Supp. 11 1972).
39. 41 Fed. Reg. 45,015-19 (1976). A list of the reports consulted in assembling this
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Technology forcing today is primarily used in the environmental
field of pollution control, 40 but it is becoming more prevalent in the
health and safety field.41 Technology forcing laws have been enacted in
other areas pursuant to a congressional intent to both force technology
and to disregard industry arguments relating to economic unfeasibili-
ty.42 These laws, however, do not accomplish the technology forcing
goal as effectively as does the MMPA because they are weakened by
provisions allowing defenses based on attempts at good faith com-
pliance and the unavailability of equipment necessary for such com-
pliance. 43 More importantly, these statutes unlike the MMPA have
been emasculated by the reluctance of the courts to support strict
enforcement. 44
data can be found in 41 Fed. Reg. 49,859, 49,861 (1976). Final regulations were published
in March, 1977. 42 Fed. Reg. 13,997 (1977).
40. Texas v. EPA, 499 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1974); NRDC, Inc. v. EPA, 489 F.2d 390
(5th Cir. 1974); Izaak Walton League v. Schlesinger, 337 F. Supp. 287 (D.D.C. 1971);
Consolidation Coal Co. v. Kandle, 105 N.J. Super. 104, 251 A.2d 295 (App. Div. 1969).
41. Under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C. §§
1381-1431 (1966), the Department of Transportation set new standards requiring vehicles
to be equipped with passive restraint devices (air bags) which had not yet been devel-
oped. See Chrysler Corp. v. Department of Transp., 472 F.2d 659 (6th Cir. 1972).
Technology forcing is also prevalent in the area of occupational safety. Under the
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1970), the Depart-
ment of Labor set standards limiting the exposure of persons who work with vinyl
chloride to no greater than one part per million over any eight-hour period. The manufac-
turers claimed that this policy was technologically and economically unfeasible. The
court held the regulations to be valid and declared that the Secretary of Labor is not
limited to the status quo in promulgating safety and health policies under the Act. "He
may raise standards which require improvement in existing technology or which require
the development of new technology and is not limited to issuing standards based solely
on devices already developed." Society of Plastics Industry, Inc. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d
1301, 1309 (2d Cir. 1975).
42. Clean Air Amendments of 1970,42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1970); National Environmental
Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1970); Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1970).
43. Under the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1970) such good
faith arguments can be raised. Any order issued by the Administrator directing com-
pliance with the provisions of an implementation plan must "specify a time for com-
pliance which the Administrator determines is reasonable, taking into account the
seriousness of the violation and any good faith efforts to apply with applicable require-
ments." Id. § 1857c-8(a)(4).
[Tihis reflects Congressional intent that serious violations be corrected expeditious-
ly, and yet recognizes that compliance may in some instances border on the
impossible, despite the good faith effort of a party subject to regulation. Where
such is the case, the good faith efforts of that party are worthy of consideration in
terms of compliance schedules as well as the imposition of penalties.
Indiana & Mich. EIec. Co. v. EPA, 509 F.2d 839, 845 (7th Cir. 1975). See Union Elec.
Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246 (1976).
44. The court's response to statutes dealing more closely with the human environ-
ment may be due to the widespread economic repercussions of statutory enforcement
[Vol. 14:263
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The court's response to the MMPA in Committee for Humane Legis-
lation may merely reflect a willingness to enforce an environmental
technology forcing law which does not have a widespread detrimental
effect on the economy.45 It is possible that the availability of an
alternative method of catching tuna, the traditional pole method, may
have been an important consideration to the court since this would
prevent the total collapse of the tuna industry. The decision may also
reflect the public's preference in allowing stringent enforcement of
wildlife protection laws which do not result in a major change in
lifestyle or a major hardship to the people.4
The decision in Committee for Humane Legislation represents a
major advance in judicial willingness to enforce a congressional decla-
ration which gives special status to certain wildlife species. 47 Further-
more, the previous practice of using inadequate information in issuing
regulations is replaced by the requirement that the government may
not act without sophisticated scientific data to support its action.48 The
case is an indication of the courts' willingness to stringently enforce
wildlife protection statutes in order to protect species endangered by
the economic exploitation of the environment.
Margaret Conley
and the disproportionate impact of these standards in older industrialized urban areas.
See Technology Forcing, note 35 supra, at 792.
45. Tuna fishermen and canners have limited lobbying power because of their limited
numbers. Where the result would be great unemployment the legislature and the courts
are rarely willing to stringently impose technology forcing. For example, EPA con-
sidered the unemployment that would result if they imposed a total ban on the pro-
duction of vinyl chloride and polyvinyl chloride and instead adopted a standard based on
presently available technology for asbestos emissions. 40 Fed. Reg. 59,532, 59,534
(1975).
46. Technology Forcing, note 35 supra, at 775. See 193 SCIENCE 744-47 (1976).
47. See Special Status of Wildlife Receives Judicial Approval, 6 E.L.R. 10270, 10271
(1976).
48. See Federal Courts and Congress Review Tuna-Porpoise Controversy, 6 E.L.R.
10147, 10149 (1976). More recently, the Ninth Circuit followed the court in Richardson
and refused to overturn the governmental ban until proper regulations were issued. M/V
Theresa Ann v. Richardson, 7 E.L.R. 20065 (S.D. Cal. 1976).
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